Megan Woodward

After nearly a decade of cautious hope following the 2016 peace accord, Colombia once again faces intensifying violence at the hands of dissident armed groups. President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace strategy—once hailed as an innovative alternative to militarized security—is faltering under the weight of escalating attacks, failing ceasefires, and community distrust. The resurgence of conflict is not simply a setback; it reflects a much deeper rupture in Colombia’s political landscape, where the foundations of peace were never as solid as they seemed.

Background

Since the 1960s, FARC-EP and other revolutionaries have been shaping Colombia’s fate through violence and drug trafficking. It was not until 2016 that the Colombian government finally struck a peace accord with the group, leading to the disarmament and demobilization of the majority of its forces. Key word: majority. EMC and other splinter groups rejected the 2016 peace deal and took advantage of the power vacuum left by FARC-EP. EMC preserved key vacuum left by FARC-EP. EMC preserved key command structures, revenue sources, and territorial networks. Their decision reflected enduring mistrust of state reintegration programs, many of which were underfunded or delayed.

Total Peace: A Risky Gamble

When Petro took office in 2022, he attempted to address those unresolved tensions through Total Peace, an ambitious plan to negotiate with all remaining armed groups. Unlike previous presidents who prioritized military confrontation, Petro believed dialogue could unlock stability where force had historically failed.

For a moment, Total Peace’s negotiation strategy appeared promising. In September 2023, EMC agreed to a ten-month ceasefire, and negotiations touched on territorial control and the dismantling of illicit economies. EMC even pledged to end kidnappings for ransom, something no dissident faction had seriously considered before.

But these early wins masked a fundamental problem: EMC is not a single organization. Rather it is a constellation of semi-autonomous fronts with diverging priorities and power ambitions. Any agreement reached in Bogotá was vulnerable to collapse in the countryside.

An EMC attack on an Indigenous guard in Cauca led to a breakdown of the ceasefire in 2024. The government accused the group of non-compliance and restored military operations. EMC retaliated by killing police officers; the army killed 15 dissidents. What was meant to be a roadmap toward de-escalation instead accelerated a return to violence.

2025: Conflict Emerges Again

By early 2025, Colombia had deteriorated further. Fighting erupted in Catatumbo between EMC, the ELN, and other groups. Alliances shifted rapidly and control of territory changed within days. The number of bomb attacks, ambushes, and targeted killings rose sharply. One recent attack, which left one police officer dead and four injured, underscored the growing sophistication of EMC operations.

According to Colombia’s Ombudsman’s Office, more than 230 municipalities are now under the influence of armed groups—the highest level since the 2016 peace deal.

The humanitarian repercussions are severe. Rural communities report increased displacement, aggressive recruitment of minors, and restrictions on mobility imposed by armed actors. Local leaders face heightened assassination risks, while civilians navigate a security landscape in which both state forces and dissident groups compete for territorial control.

The government’s strategic resources are stretched thin. Petro insists negotiations remain essential, but communities now face daily uncertainty with no clear sign of de-escalation.

Structural, Not Sudden

What makes the current moment a true punto de ruptura is not simply the violence itself, but the convergence of multiple systemic failures:

• EMC’s internal divisions make negotiations and ceasefire enforcements near impossible.
• Armed groups can exploit the lack of infrastructure in rural Colombia quicker than the government can fix it.
• Coca cultivation and illegal mining are so deeply embedded that peace agreements alone cannot shut down.
• Communities increasingly doubt both the rebels’ commitments and the government’s capacity to protect them. Peace without legitimacy is peace without durability.

These pressures are not new, but their simultaneous intensification places Colombia in a uniquely precarious position. The country is not merely experiencing a spike in violence, it is facing a test of whether the post-2016 peace framework can survive at all.

Looking to the Future

Petro’s government is trying to salvage Total Peace by reopening channels of communication while increasing targeted military presence. But each new attack erodes public confidence and strengthens critics who argue that negotiations reward criminality.

The 2016 accord was meant to be Colombia’s turning point. Instead, the country is now experiencing an inverse turning point, where the gains of peace risk sliding backward into renewed conflict.

Colombia stands at a crossroads. One path leads toward deeper fragmentation, escalating insurgency, and the unraveling of a decade of peace-building. The other path requires rethinking the foundations of peace itself: state presence, rural development, economic alternatives, and public trust.

Whether Colombia can pull itself back from this breaking point will determine its political trajectory for years to come.